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TAIWAN’S WTO MEMBERSHIP AND ITS 
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Steve Charnovitz∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In contrast to other international organizations, the World Trade 
Organization does not require its members to be states. This 
constitutional feature has allowed Taiwan to join the WTO alongside 
China. As a result, the WTO is now the only major international 
organization in which Taiwan can participate as a full member.   
This article explores some implications of this unique situation 
for Taiwan, for the WTO, and for international law. The article 
contends that Taiwan’s membership in the WTO is not itself a 
bilateral treaty with China and does not itself change the legal 
relationship between Taiwan and China. What Taiwan’s membership 
does do, however, is to establish some rule of law between Taiwan 
and China and to give Taiwan standing in an international tribunal 
should it wish to assert that China has violated WTO rules. The 
parallel memberships of Taiwan and China also provide a neutral 
international forum for those two governments to meet and 
negotiate if needed. The article also points out some dangers to the 
WTO that stem from Taiwan’s exclusion from international 
standard-setting organizations. The article recommends that the 
WTO do more to assist Taiwan in carrying out its WTO obligations 
that involve the international community. 
In joining the WTO, Taiwan has enhanced its sovereignty in the 
                                                 
∗ George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.  A preliminary version of this study 
was delivered at the “International Conference on the United Nations and Taiwan,” sponsored by the 
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modern sense of being able to participate in world governance. So 
far, Taiwan’s membership in the WTO has not facilitated its quest for 
a capacity to participate in the World Health Organization. 
KEYWORDS:  accession; China; dispute settlement; Doha round; 
environment;  GATT;  health;  IMF;  international agreement;  international law;  
international organization;  international relations; sovereignty; Taipei; 
Taiwan;  world trade; WTO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fifth year of Taiwan’s membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is an appropriate time to consider the implications of this special 
status for the WTO, for Taiwan’s relationship with the People’s Republic of 
China (“China”), and for international law. International trade has been 
occurring regularly since antiquity and was one of the earliest areas for 
economic regulation by governments. The building of the world trading 
system culminating in the establishment of the WTO in 1995 is an important 
achievement in international cooperation to supervise governmental trade 
policies and other policies that affect trade. Because the scope of WTO law is 
so broad within a globalizing world economy, the ability of a government to 
join and participate in WTO decisionmaking is now more vital than ever. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the implications of Taiwan’s 
membership in the WTO. The WTO is now the only major international 
organization (IO) that permits Taiwan to become a Member. Because most 
commentators consider Taiwan to be a part of unitary China, Taiwan cannot 
be and is not considered a “state,” and thus is not eligible for membership in 
the United Nations (U.N.) or most other international organizations.  Besides 
the WTO, Taiwan is a Member of the Asian Development Bank, the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council, and some other organizations noted below. 
Nevertheless, WTO membership is Taiwan’s most important 
achievement in revitalizing its status on the international plane. Being a 
WTO Member will give Taiwan the same opportunities that other WTO 
Members have. Yet Taiwan’s WTO membership also carries with it some 
distinctive features that stem from Taiwan’s lack of international personality.  
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The purpose of this article is to analyze these features, which heretofore have 
been given little attention by commentators. Hundreds of articles have been 
written about China and the WTO, but few about Taiwan and the WTO. 
Taiwan’s WTO membership also has implications beyond the WTO. If 
Taiwan can join the WTO, why not other international organizations that 
purport to be world organizations, such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO)? The answer is that Taiwan is not recognized as a state and this lack 
of status is apparently more important than Taiwan’s interest in public health 
and the world community’s interest in Taiwan’s activities regarding public 
health. Yet the world community’s disassociational tendencies toward 
Taiwan are in tension with Taiwan’s good standing in the WTO. This 
anomalous situation is discussed further in this article. 
The article proceeds in five parts:  Following this brief Introduction, Part 
II provides background information on Taiwan’s quest for WTO 
membership. Part III describes the main developments regarding Taiwan’s 
role in the WTO, and then analyzes some implications of Taiwan’s 
membership for the WTO and for Taiwan’s bilateral relationship with China.  
Part IV considers the implications of Taiwan’s WTO membership for 
Taiwan’s status in international law and international organizations, 
particularly the WHO. Part V concludes. 
Because the nomenclature of “Taiwan” is politically controversial, 
Taiwan goes by different names as a Member of various intergovernmental 
organizations. In the WTO, Taiwan is called the “Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)”. (Yet in 
the short-name listings on the WTO website, Taiwan is called “Chinese 
Taipei,” and is listed alphabetically as the first “T.”) In the Asian 
Development Bank, Taiwan is called “Taipei China.” In APEC, Taiwan is 
called “Chinese Taipei.” In the Asian Productivity Organization, Taiwan is 
called the “Republic of China.” That is also the name for Taiwan in the 
Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization and the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration. In the International Cotton Advisory 
Committee, Taiwan is termed “China (Taiwan).” In the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), the current practice is that if, in exceptional cases, there 
is a need to mention Taiwan in an ILO document, then the reference should 
be to “Taiwan, China.”1 In the OECD’s High-Level Group of Trade and 
Industry Officials, Taiwan is referred to as “Chinese Taipei.” In this article, 
Taiwan will be called “Taiwan.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ctry-ndx.htm. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON TAIWAN IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 
The saga of Taiwan’s participation in the world trade system began in 
the late 1940s. The Republic of China was one of the original signatories of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but the Nationalist 
government withdrew in March 1950 in part because it could no longer 
fulfill trade commitments of Mainland China. In 1965, Taiwan applied for 
and received GATT observer status.2 Then in 1971, the GATT took away 
Taiwan’s observer status after the People’s Republic of China was given 
China’s seat in the United Nations, and Taiwan’s representatives were 
expelled.3 This was one instance of the practice of the GATT to follow U.N. 
decisions on high political matters.4  
Taiwan began its odyssey to join the GATT in 1990.5 A working party 
on Chinese Taipei was set up in 1992 and Taiwan became an observer.6 At 
that time, the Chairman of the GATT Council stated that all parties had 
agreed that there was only one China, and the Chairman then proposed that 
Taiwan’s entry should not be finalized until after China’s entry.7  That 
sequencing was agreed to.  
Because of that initial decision, Taiwan’s accession was delayed for 11 
years until China’s accession could be negotiated.8 The details of China’s 
accession proved very difficult to work out because China was asked to 
accept special rules in its accession different from what was required by 
normal WTO rules.9 Taiwan was granted accession to the WTO on 11 
                                                 
2 James V. Feinerman, Taiwan and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 39, 41 (1992). 
3 Susanna Chan, Taiwan’s Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the Conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275, 278–79 (1994). 
4 See WTO, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 877 (1995). 
5 Lori Fisler Damrosch, GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China and the 
Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 19, 24 (1992); Sheryl WuDunn, Taiwan’s 
Chances Rising for World Trade Status, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, § 1, at 21. 
6 Lei Wang, Separate Customs Territory in GATT and Taiwan’s Request for GATT Membership, 
25(5) J. WORLD TRADE, 5 (1991). 
7 WTO, supra note 4, at 1017–18.  
8 It is interesting to recall Lori Damrosch’s observation in 1992 that it would be irrational and legally 
unwarranted to put Taiwan’s application to the GATT on hold if either economic or political reasons 
might delay consideration of China’s entry for a prolonged period.  See Damrosch, supra note 5, at 
34, 37. 
9 See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade 
Organization Legal System. An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 
483 (2003). See also Yang Guohua & Cheng Jin, The Process of China’s Accession to the WTO, 4 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 297 (2001). Even during the GATT era, there were some GATT-plus and 
GATT-minus accession protocol provisions.  For example, in 1967, Poland agreed to increase its 
imports annually by seven percent (GATT-plus).  See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 287 (1st ed. 1992); Donald C. Clarke, GATT Membership for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND 
L. REV. 517, 520 (1994).  Poland (in 1967), Romania (1971), and Hungary (1973) agreed to accept 
discriminatory safeguards against it (GATT-minus).  See Robert E. Herzstein, China and the GATT: 
Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China’s Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, 18 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 371, 397 (1986). 
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November 2001, a day after similar action occurred with respect to China. 
The effective date of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO was 1 January 2002, 
which was 21 days after China’s entry.  
The reason why the WTO was able to admit Taiwan, in spite of its 
contested international legal status, is that membership in the WTO is not 
contingent upon statehood. Almost all WTO Member countries are “states,” 
yet WTO membership is available not only to states, but also to any 
“separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this 
[WTO] Agreement . ”10 Taiwan entered into the WTO through accession as 
a customs territory. Taiwan is apparently the only “customs territory” ever 
admitted to the multilateral trading system (that is, from 1947 forward) 
without direct sponsorship by a state exercising diplomatic relations for it.11  
No judicial review in the WTO is available as to the determination of 
whether an entity qualifies as a “separate customs territory possessing full 
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations.”12 
Taiwan’s Accession Agreement 
The most useful prism for examining an accession agreement identifies 
“WTO-plus” and “WTO-minus” provisions. 13  WTO-plus provisions are 
additional obligations applying to the acceded Member that do not apply to 
incumbent WTO Members. For example, a requirement to implement a 
provision of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (hereinafter “TRIPS”) immediately rather than on the 
timetable that would apply to incumbent WTO Members constitutes a 
WTO-plus provision. WTO-minus provisions are reduced obligations on 
incumbent WTO Members with regard to the treatment they must apply to 
the acceded Member. For example, a discriminatory safeguard against a new 
entrant is a WTO-minus provision. Some analysts would characterize a 
WTO-minus provision as a reduction in the “rights” of the joining Member, 
                                                 
10 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. XII:1, Apr. 15, 1994, in 
WORLD TRADE  ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 7 (1999) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
11 In other words, the other customs territories that became GATT parties through accession did so 
pursuant to GATT 1994 Art. XXVI:5(c) rather than the provision that Taiwan based its original 
application on which was GATT 1994 Art. XXXIII. See Pasha L. Hsieh, Facing China: Taiwan’s 
Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization, 39(6) J. WORLD TRADE 
1195, 1200 (2005). No separate customs territories entered the GATT 1994 under Article XXXIII. 
12 The term “customs territory” is defined in GATT 1994 Art. XXIV:2. Part III of this paper takes 
note of some incapacities by Taiwan that raise a question as to its eligibility to have been made a 
WTO Member. 
13 See Qin, supra note 9, for an articulation of the WTO-plus concept, but not the WTO-minus 
concept. 
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in contrast to a WTO-plus provision which is an increase in international 
obligations. In this article, I do not use such “rights talk.” 
WTO-plus and WTO-minus provisions are the product of a negotiation 
ending in mutual agreement. The applicant consents to WTO-plus and 
WTO-minus provisions as part of the price for joining the WTO. The 
applicant remains free not to join the WTO, and so one might say that 
nothing at all is imposed.  
Such a view is unrealistic, however, and misses the “new sovereignty” in 
international law.14 In the traditional view, sovereignty is autonomy, and so a 
decision by a government to WTO-minus and WTO-plus provisions is an 
exercise of its sovereign choice.15 In the modern view, sovereignty is the 
legal capacity to belong to the international community and to participate in 
IOs. From that perspective, when a government wants to join the WTO but 
cannot, that government’s sovereignty is diminished.  In order to gain that 
sovereignty, a government may be willing to accept the imposition of 
unequal and unfair membership conditions. But even though they are 
accepted, such conditions are still being imposed. 
Accession negotiations occur formally between the WTO and the 
applicant government.16 The WTO Agreement states that accession occurs 
on terms “to be agreed between it [the applicant] and the WTO.” Thus, an 
accession negotiation results in a quasi-contractual agreement between the 
WTO itself and the acceded Member. That agreement is a “Protocol” to the 
WTO treaty and notionally is enforceable under WTO dispute settlement. So 
far, no cases have occurred over the enforcement of Accession Protocol 
provisions, but consultations are now ongoing against China regarding 
accession commitments on auto parts. 
Who is responsible for writing the provisions contained in an accession 
agreement? Two views are possible.   
One view emphasizes that although the WTO Agreement states that 
decisions on accession are made by the Ministerial Conference through a 
two-thirds vote,17 the actual practice is that the terms of an accession are 
negotiated in a working party that uses consensus decision-making. Thus, a 
government applying to the WTO cannot join until it gains the consent of all 
WTO Members. (China was not yet a Member when the WTO approved 
Taiwan’s accession.) As a result, accession agreements are an amalgam of 
                                                 
14 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 27 (1995) 
(introducing these concepts); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked 
World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 286 (2004) (discussing the work of CHAYES & CHAYES). For 
a discussion of sovereignty-enhancing theory, see Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate 
in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841 (2003). 
15 Another perspective is that a country can lose sovereignty when it is on the weak end of a 
power-based negotiation. 
16 See WTO Agreement, Art. XII:1. 
17 Id. Art. XII:2. 
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the results of the individual negotiations between interested WTO Members 
and the applicant country.18 So from that perspective, one could say that the 
terms of accession are the responsibility of the individual incumbent 
Members.   
The other view is that the WTO itself is the responsible entity for the 
provisions in accession agreements. Thus, the WTO qua organization should 
get the credit or blame for the WTO-plus and WTO-minus provisions in an 
accession agreement. 
Accession agreements are almost by definition unequal treaties. The 
acceding country makes all (or nearly all) the commitments. The incumbent 
WTO Members do not undertake new obligations (or only rarely do so).19 A 
country joining the WTO cannot seek a WTO panel to challenge the fairness 
of the accession agreement because WTO dispute settlement lacks any 
judicial review of WTO Ministerial Conference decisions. 
In addition to rule-based commitments, an accession agreement also 
includes specific commitments on market access for goods and services.  
Such commitments are neither WTO-plus nor WTO-minus because the 
WTO does not require any particular level of market access. A government 
seeking to join the WTO might be asked to provide more market access than 
some incumbent WTO Members apply, but such “entry-fees” are a 
traditional part of the trading system, and distinguishable from the new 
WTO-plus and WTO-minus rule-based provisions. 
A commitment to follow WTO rules is also not WTO-plus or 
WTO-minus. Such a commitment is plain WTO. Although it would seem 
redundant for an applying country to commit to follow WTO rules that it 
would be obligated to follow anyway, such provisions are common in 
accession negotiations, perhaps because they provide comfort to current 
WTO governments. A commitment to enact a law (or regulation) required by 
WTO rules or to repeal a law (or regulation) disallowed by WTO rules is also 
not a WTO-plus provision, but rather an action taken to conform to WTO 
rules. 20 
In contrast to the WTO Protocol with China, the Protocol with Taiwan 
has far fewer WTO-plus or WTO-minus provisions. 21 Taiwan’s market 
accession commitments were substantial, however, and were developed 
through 26 bilateral negotiations. For goods, Taiwan agreed to reduce its 
                                                 
18 See RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW 1117 (2005). 
19 During the GATT era, there were a few accession protocols where incumbent contracting parties 
made commitments to the new GATT entrant. See Gardner Patterson, The GATT: Categories, 
Problems and Procedures of Membership, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 7, 14 (1992) (giving the 
examples of Poland, Hungary and Romania vis-à-vis countries in the European Communities). 
20 See the Conformity Clause in the WTO Agreement, Art. XVI:4. 
21 See Working Party, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, ¶ 21, WT/ACC/TPKM/18 (Oct. 5, 2001). See also 
Robin J. Winkler, Taiwan WTO Survey, 15 CHINA L. & PRACTICE 47 (2001). 
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average tariffs from 6.0% to 4.15% for industrial goods and from 20.0% to 
12.9% for agricultural goods. For services, for example, Taiwan agreed to 
permit expanded foreign investment in telecom, and to permit foreign 
insurance companies to sell more types of insurance.   
Taiwan’s Protocol has some important applicant WTO-plus provisions.  
In particular, Taiwan agreed to permit advertising for alcoholic beverages in 
all media (subject to regulation on content and timing), to ensure 
transparency in privatization, to apply TRIPS without recourse to the normal 
transitional period, and to notify any new measures related to TRIPS to the 
WTO at least 60 days before they are implemented.22 In addition, Taiwan 
agreed to become a Member of the optional WTO Agreement on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft and to seek accession to the optional Agreement on 
Government Procurement. 
Another specialized feature of Taiwan’s Accession is that the WTO 
negotiated a Special Exchange Agreement with Taiwan on monetary issues.  
Such action is provided for in the GATT article on Exchange Agreements 
which provides that any WTO Member that is not a Member of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) shall become a Member of the Fund or 
enter into a “Special Exchange Agreement” with the WTO.23 Because the 
IMF has not permitted Taiwan to become a Member, Taiwan negotiated a 
Special Exchange Agreement with the WTO as part of Accession.24 By its 
terms, this Exchange Agreement is enforceable through WTO dispute 
settlement.25 
The Exchange Agreement is WTO-plus because it imposes a series of 
disciplines on Taiwan regarding: economic and exchange policies, the 
avoidance of restrictions on payments to current account, controls on capital 
transfers, and restrictions on payments. These disciplines go well beyond 
WTO rules and seemingly well beyond the general rules of the IMF. If so, 
one wonders how this Special Exchange Agreement can be reconciled with 
the requirement in GATT Article XV:7(b) that “The terms of any such 
[Special Exchange] agreement shall not impose obligations on the 
contracting party in exchange matters generally more restrictive than those 
imposed by the Articles of Agreement on the International Monetary Fund 
                                                 
22 Id. ¶ 219. No such requirement is contained in Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Art. 63.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULT OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 348 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
23  GATT 1947 Art. XV:6. The GATT 1994 headnote ¶ 2(b) explains that the references to 
CONTRACTING PARTIES are replaced by WTO.  
24 WTO Doc., Special Exchange Agreement between the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu and the World Trade Organization, Annex II, in Accession Decision,  
WT/L/433 (Nov. 23, 2001). 
25 Id. Art. VI:4.  
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on Members of the Fund.” Taiwan is the only new WTO Member that has 
been asked to sign such an Exchange Agreement.  
Because Taiwan is not a Member of the IMF, the Agreement provides 
that whenever the WTO consults with the IMF on issues particularly 
affecting Taiwan, the WTO shall take measures to “ensure effective 
presentation” of Taiwan’s case to the Fund, including, without limitation, the 
transmission to the Fund of any views communicated by Taiwan to the 
WTO.26 This may give Taiwan, in a small way, an indirect channel into the 
IMF, and in that sense, the provision enhances Taiwan’s sovereignty. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that as with all WTO accession protocols, 
Taiwan’s Protocol was to be registered in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. That Article requires “Every treaty and 
every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United 
Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible 
be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.” Of course, neither the 
WTO nor Taiwan is a Member of the United Nations. 
III. THE INFLUENCE OF TAIWAN’S MEMBERSHIP ON THE WTO AND 
WORLD TRADE 
This part addresses several interrelated topics: first, Taiwan’s 
intellectual contribution to the Doha trade round; second, other important 
contributions by Taiwan to ongoing WTO work; third, the special problems 
in the world trade regime arising from Taiwan’s anomalous status; and fourth, 
the implications of Taiwan’s WTO membership for Taiwan’s bilateral 
relationship with China. 
A . Taiwan and the Doha Round 
The Government of Taiwan has been a constructive participant in the 
ongoing WTO multilateral trade negotiations. Taiwan has issued several 
proposals on key topics in the negotiations, some of which are discussed 
below. On non-agricultural market access, Taiwan has taken the lead in 
suggesting that newly-acceding Member governments be treated differently 
in negotiations.27
 
Taiwan’s concern is that acceding countries have recently 
made the greatest effort they could on trade liberalization. Asking them to 
immediately liberalize again in the Doha Round is inappropriate, according 
to Taiwan, because private enterprises in the acceding country have a 
reasonable expectation of some continuity of trade policy for their business 
decisions. Taiwan is not arguing that liberalization is bad for a country as a 
                                                 
26 Id. Art. VI:3. 
27 See WTO Doc., TN/MA/W/19/Add.1 (May 16, 2003); see also WTO Doc., TN/MA/W19/Add.3 
(July 8, 2003). 
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whole; rather, the argument is that having extensively liberalized as part of 
its WTO entry, a new Member government should not have to swallow a 
second dose and thereby hurt its domestic industries. In services, Taiwan has 
proposed a negotiating initiative on computer and related services and noted 
that it could contribute to addressing the digital divide among countries.28  
On regional trade agreements, Taiwan has offered a far-reaching proposal to 
create a new discipline requiring that regional agreements on goods and/or 
services contain an accession clause that would allow non-parties to join the 
agreement under reasonable conditions.29 Such a clause could reduce the 
discrimination inherent in a regional or bilateral agreement and move 
countries in the direction of open regionalism. On countervailing duties, 
Taiwan has proposed new rules regarding facts available, sunset, sampling, 
and new shipper reviews.30 On antidumping, Taiwan has proposed new rules 
de minimis margins, affiliated parties, and the definition of a domestic 
industry.31 
On dispute settlement transparency, Taiwan has adopted the line of other 
Asian countries to oppose the U.S. and European initiatives for improving 
transparency in WTO dispute settlement.32
 
The arguments Taiwan is making 
for exclusion of nongovernmental views are similar to arguments made by 
other governments. Yet the fact that Taiwan is making them is noteworthy 
and surely sends a signal. As a new Member, Taiwan has no need to defend 
the constitutional provisions in the WTO that inhibit transparency because 
Taiwan did not participate in writing those rules. Nevertheless, Taiwan 
argued against the U.S. proposal that calls for making public a government’s 
submissions to a WTO panel. According to Taiwan, “taking the dispute 
process into the public domain could lead to complications that get in the 
way of an efficient settlement.” In addition, Taiwan has argued that the WTO 
dispute mechanism was “never conceived as a public process.” In its 
submissions, Taiwan has also opposed the European Community’s proposal 
to permit unsolicited amicus curiae briefs. The reason offered by Taiwan is 
that only some WTO Member countries have well developed social 
resources such as think tanks. Thus, according to Taiwan, opening the 
WTO’s doors to more information “would create a situation where those 
Members with the least social resources could be put at a disadvantage.” 
Taiwan, of course, does not lack trade-related social resources. At present, 
Taiwan has at least two think tanks focusing on the WTO: the WTO 
                                                 
28 See WTO Doc., TN/S/W/10 (Jan. 8, 2003). 
29 See WTO Doc., TN/RL/W/182 (June 9, 2005). 
30 See WTO Doc., TN/RL/GEN/96 (Jan. 19, 2006). 
31 See WTO Docs., TN/RL/GEN/62 (Sept. 16, 2005), TN/RL/GEN/68 (Oct. 13, 2005), 
TN/RL/GEN/82 (Nov. 17, 2005). 
32 See Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Contribution by the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Doha Mandated Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), TN/DS/W/25 (Nov. 27, 2002). 
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Research Center at the National Taiwan University College of Law and the 
Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research. 
If any WTO Member should see the fallacy of rigid categories and 
closed processes, surely Taiwan should. The fact that Taiwan is willing to 
argue against fostering communication between the public and the WTO 
shows its rapid inculcation of the WTO “club” mentality. Typically, 
governments argue against briefs by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
on the grounds that such views should be communicated upward through 
one’s own state. For obvious reasons, Taiwan does not parrot that 
state-centric line. Instead, Taiwan premises its support for exclusion on the 
assumption that some WTO Members have more “social resources” than 
others. Obviously, this is true, but it is surprising that Taiwan leaps to the 
conclusion that think tanks in Country A are going to support Country A in a 
dispute. If this conclusion is wrong, then it would be possible that allowing 
international nongovernmental social resources to be heard may somewhat 
alleviate the current distortions of debate at the WTO in which the richer 
countries have greater diplomatic resources. 
On other dispute settlement matters, Taiwan has proposed several 
thoughtful amendments to Dispute Settlement Understanding. 33  For 
example, Taiwan proposed that third parties have greater access to 
submissions of the parties to panels and the Appellate Body and that third 
parties receive the panel report at the interim review stage. So on this issue, 
Taiwan does see the benefit of transparency. Another Taiwanese 
transparency proposal is to facilitate third party intervention of dispute 
proceedings. 
On trade and the environment, Taiwan has sided with those governments 
advocating a broad interpretation of the negotiating mandate regarding the 
relationship between WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in 
multilateral environmental agreements. In particular, Taiwan states that 
specific trade obligations should include not only the obligations in a treaty 
but also certain decisions made by the Conference of the Parties to an 
agreement.34 This more inclusive view is appropriate, according to Taiwan, 
because the mandate should cover “regimes with institutional function, 
which engage in law-making process and create mandatory regulations 
among their contracting parties.” Taiwan’s position is being welcomed by 
the nongovernmental environmental community because Taiwan apparently 
recognizes the more dynamic character of environmental governance as 
compared to trade governance. 
A related question that has come up in the course of negotiations is that 
if the WTO is to provide some deference to environmental treaties, a method 
is needed for determining which treaties qualify. Several conditions have 
                                                 
33 See WTO Doc., TN/DS/W/36 (Jan. 22, 2003). 
34 See WTO Doc., TN/TE/W/36 (July 3, 2003). 
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been proposed over the years including that a qualifying environmental 
treaty would need to be open to all WTO Member governments.35 In its 
submission to the WTO, Taiwan makes the cogent observation that a WTO 
Member unable to participate in environmental treaties, then this condition 
could end up excluding all those treaties from the intended WTO 
deference.36 That is because Taiwan generally is not allowed to be a party to 
or to participate in environmental treaties. 
Taiwan has taken a constructive position regarding tariff elimination on 
fishery products.37
 
Taiwan notes that the economic value of liberalizing 
international trade in fish might be dwarfed by the environmental 
disadvantages from further depletion of fisheries stimulated by trade.  
Taiwan does not argue that more trade will have that effect. Instead, Taiwan 
offers a more nuanced point that there is a need to take into consideration the 
full extent of environmental impact from higher levels of trade.38 Taiwan 
points to a recent study by WWF which indicates that wild fish are the main 
ingredient in fish feed used in aquaculture. Taiwan’s interest in WTO 
environmental issues may stem from its relatively forward-looking 
environmental policies.39 
Note that all of Taiwan’s proposals discussed above are proposals that 
Taiwan has made on its own. Taiwan has also joined other WTO Members, 
such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Communities, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong China, Israel, Japan, Korea, 
Liechtenstein, Mongolia, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and the United 
States in making joint negotiating proposals. Taken as a whole, Taiwan has 
participated as fully as any other country in ongoing WTO negotiations and 
has networked well.40 
 
 
                                                 
35 See generally Duncan Brack, Environmental Treaties and Trade: Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 
321 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
36 See WTO Doc., TN/TE/W/11 (Oct. 3, 2002). 
37 See WTO Doc., TN/MA/W19/Add. 2 (July 7, 2003).  
38 For background on the issue itself in an Asian context, see René Vossenaar & Veena Jha, 
Competitiveness: An Asian Perspective, in ASIAN DRAGONS AND GREEN TRADE 49 (Simon S.C. Tay 
& Daniel C. Esty eds., 1996). 
39 In 2006, Taiwan ranked 24 out of 133 countries in the annual Environmental Performance Index.  
(Lower is better in this study.) Taiwan ranked just below Germany and Spain and just above Slovakia, 
Chile, the Netherlands, and the United States. The full study is available at http://beta.sedac.ciesin. 
columbia.edu/es/epi/downloads/2006EPI_Brochure.pdf. 
40 For example, Taiwan is a Member of the informal WTO negotiating groups “Friends of  Sectoral 
Approaches,” Friends of Antidumping, and the G-10 group of food importing Members. 
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B . Other Contributions by Taiwan to the WTO 
Outside of formal Doha Round negotiations, Taiwan has been active on 
several fronts in WTO governance. Taiwan proposed some improvements in 
the fairness of WTO Accession processes with regard to government 
procurement.41  Its specific reform initiative states that Members of the 
Agreement on Government Procurement shall not request WTO applicant 
countries to make offers that exceed those of most of the existing parties to 
the Agreement. Taiwan’s proposal also provides a time limit for parties to 
respond to the offer of the applicant country. In the WTO negotiations on 
trade in generic drugs, Taiwan agreed to join leading industrial countries in 
opting out of using the system as an importer.42 In addition, Taiwan has 
contributed over $730,000 to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust 
Fund. 
In June 2006, Taiwan received its first Trade Policy Review at the WTO. 
During the discussion WTO Members expressed concern that inbound 
cross-strait trade was prohibited on some 2,000 tariff lines, and that little 
inbound cross-strait investment had been allowed. 43  At the end of the 
discussion, the chairperson said that “Chinese Taipei provides an excellent 
model as a newly-acceded WTO Member.”44 At one point in the discussion, 
China’s representative asked the representative from El Salvador to respect 
WTO regulations after El Salvador referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of 
China.”45 
During its WTO Membership, Taiwan has been a steady participant in 
WTO dispute settlement. Taiwan has been a third party in 15 cases in which 
panel reports have been issued, four of them without China. Looking ahead, 
it would certainly be possible to find Taiwan and China on opposite sides of 
a dispute, or even for Taiwan to bring a case against China, or vice versa.46  
In 2004, Taiwan joined the Advisory Center on WTO Law, which will 
enhance Taiwan’s access to trade dispute settlement expertise. 
                                                 
41 See WTO Doc., GPA/W/224 (Nov. 20, 2002). 
42 See The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, WTO News, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www. 
wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm. 
43 Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson, Trade Policy Review, Chinese Taipei (June 20 & 22, 
2006), ¶ 5, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp266_crc_e.htm. 
44 Id. ¶ 10. 
45 This is based on a press report. Taiwan Trade Policy Review at WTO Draws to “Perfect End”, 
BBC MONITORING, June 22, 2006. The minutes of the Trade Policy review remain a restricted WTO 
document. 
46  See Qingjiang Kong, Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Resolve Trade Disputes 
between China and Taiwan?, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 747 (2002). 
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C . Looming Challenges for the WTO Relating to Taiwan’s Status 
One challenge on the horizon regarding Taiwan’s WTO membership 
involves the provisions of the WTO agreements relating to recognition of 
international standard-setting organizations. These provisions are:  
1. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) calls for 
Members to use international standards as a basis for a government’s 
technical regulations except when such international standards would be an 
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued, and then defines international bodies to be bodies 
“whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all [WTO] 
Members.”47 
2. The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection mandates the use of 
international standards in some instances, and defines those standards as 
those adopted by a governmental or nongovernmental body “whose 
membership is open to all Members.”48 
3. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) imposes a 
discipline on the use of licensing and qualification requirements that impair 
specific commitments, but lists as an adjudicative factor, the international 
standards of relevant international organizations applied by that Member, 
and then defines “relevant international organizations” to be bodies “whose 
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the 
WTO.”49 
4. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) lists three IOs that promulgate international standards under 
the Agreement, and then notes that for matters not covered by those 
organizations, international standards could include standards promulgated 
                                                 
47 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Arts. 2.4, 2.6 & Annex 1, ¶ 4, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 122,123,138 (1999) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
48 See Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, art. 2.4 & n.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE 
LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
202 (1999). 
49 General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. VI:5  & n.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE 
LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
292 (1999) [hereinafter GATS]. 
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by other relevant international organizations “open for Membership to all 
Members,” as identified by the SPS Committee.50 
All of these provisions are problematic for Taiwan and the WTO 
because none of these organizations – named specifically or generally 
referred to – is “open” to Taiwan. It would appear that the drafters of these 
WTO provisions never contemplated the possibility that there would be a 
WTO Member who is systematically excluded from most international 
bodies. Even today, there is little recognition of the problem among WTO 
Members. For example, at the WTO Trade Policy Review of Taiwan in June 
2006, WTO Members called for further harmonization of Taiwan’s technical 
standards and SPS arrangements with international ones.51 
 Eventually, the WTO will have to confront the implications of Taiwan’s 
isolated legal status for the implementation of these four provisions. Taiwan 
would appear to have leverage to keep international organizations from 
being recognized under WTO provisions. One might call this the Taiwan 
Exclusion Disqualification. For example, the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
could be denied recognition under the TBT Agreement. Such an action 
would weaken these standard-setting mechanisms, and would also hurt the 
WTO. 
Under WTO rules, Taiwan has some important obligations with respect 
to standard-setting IOs:    
1. The SPS Agreement directs Members to take part in the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the 
International Plant Protection Convention and to promote WTO-prescribed 
goals within those organizations.52 
2. The TBT Agreement directs Members to play a full part in the 
preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of standards 
for products for which either they have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical 
regulations.53 
                                                 
50 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex A, ¶ 3(d), Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, in WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXT: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 68 (1999) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. The three listed 
organizations are the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics (now 
World Organisation for Animal Health), and the International Plant Protection Convention.  At this 
time, Taiwan is not allowed to join these three organizations which have been inscribed into the SPS 
Agreement despite their discrimination against Taiwan. Note that Taiwan is obligated to follow 
standards set by these organizations even though Taiwan can have no role in drafting the standards.  
51 Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson, supra note 43, ¶ 6. 
52  SPS Agreement Art. 3.4. Recently, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy stated that “WTO 
Members have no choice but to be directly connected by the work of Codex!” Pascal Lamy, The 
WTO in the Archipelago of Global Governance, Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://www.wto.org 
/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl20_e.htm. 
53 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.6. 
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3. The GATS directs Members to “work in cooperation with relevant 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations toward the 
establishment and adoption of common international standards and criteria 
for recognition and common international standards for the practice of 
relevant services trades and professions.”54  In addition, the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications directs Members to promote international standards on 
inter-operability through the International Telecommunications Union and 
the International Organization for Standardization.55 
Currently, Taiwan would appear to be in default of all of these 
provisions because it is not being allowed to participate in the international 
organizations, bodies, and treaties named or referred to above. Thus, Taiwan 
is vulnerable to dispute settlement claims being brought against it – even by 
China, which is the country most insistent that Taiwan not be allowed to join 
such international organizations.   
In my view, the WTO should help Taiwan participate in these 
organizations as required by WTO rules. In admitting Taiwan to be a 
Member, the WTO understood Taiwan to be a customs territory that had 
“full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the 
other matters provided for in this Agreement. ”56 Yet Taiwan’s de facto 
autonomy is less than full if the organizations that Taiwan is directed to 
participate in by the WTO do not, in fact, allow Taiwan to do so. 
Another challenge to Taiwan is that it has not been able to take part in 
interparliamentary activities regarding the WTO. As many commentators 
have pointed out, elected parliaments can make a valuable contribution to the 
trading system.57 The most recent interparliamentary conference was held in 
parallel to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005. At that 
conference, eight parliamentary delegates from China attended, but none 
came from Taiwan.58 Legislators from Taiwan did not boycott the meeting.  
Rather, they could not attend because they were not invited. Under the rules 
of the Conference, eligible parliamentary participants have to come from:  (1) 
parliaments of sovereign States that are Members of the WTO, (2) 
parliaments from non-WTO Member countries that are Members of the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), or from (3) listed parliamentary 
assemblies, such as the European Parliament.59  
                                                 
54 GATS, Art. VII:5. 
55 See GATS Annex on Telecommunications, ¶ 7(a). 
56 WTO Agreement, Art. XII:1 (emphasis added). 
57  See, e.g., Meinhard Hilf, How Can Parliamentary Participation in WTO Rule-Making and 
Democratic Control Be Made More Effective? The European Context, in REFORMING THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM. LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 413 (Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann ed., 2005). 
58 See List of Participants, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/hk05/final_list.pdf. 
59 Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, Rules of Procedure, Art. 2.1, available at http://www. 
ipu.org/splz-e/trade04/rules.pdf. 
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In my view, these rules for participation are objectionable because they 
lead to overrepresentation of some countries. For example, an individual 
living in France had four representatives at the Hong Kong Conference – 
from the Parliament of France, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Assemblée parlementaire de la 
Francophonie – while an individual living in Taiwan had zero 
representatives. To my knowledge, none of the organizers of the 
Parliamentary Conference have offered any justification for such 
discrimination. 
D. Taiwan’s WTO Membership and the Bilateral China-Taiwan 
Relationship 
Taiwan’s membership in the WTO has led to mild tension with China in 
Geneva. According to a press account, the Chinese Mission to the WTO 
sends a complaining note to any government that calls Taiwan “Taiwan” in 
WTO proceedings.60 A few years ago, China suggested that Taiwan should 
change the name of its Mission to the WTO to match those of WTO 
Members Hong Kong China and Macao China.  Hong Kong’s Mission calls 
itself the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and Macao has a similar 
designation. 61  Then WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi 
reportedly asked Taiwan to adhere to China’s request.62 Taiwan refused such 
a name change. 
In July 2005, China finally accepted the name that Taiwan had given its 
Mission to the WTO which is the “Permanent Mission of the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.”63 But China 
continues to protest the use of diplomatic titles for most of the staff at 
Taiwan’s Permanent Mission. Surprisingly, the WTO Secretariat has sided 
with China and in 2005 removed those titles from the internal WTO 
Members Directory. Taiwan has protested this discriminatory action by the 
WTO Secretariat, but to no avail.64 Note that the WTO Agreement does not 
provide any judicial review of administrative actions taken by the WTO 
Secretariat. 
                                                 
60 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Supachai Urges Members to Resolve Dispute Over Taiwan Titles, Daily 
Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A33 (June 27, 2003). 
61 Taiwan Defiant on Resisting Chinese Pressure for WTO Name Change, BBC MONITORING, May 
27, 2003.  
62 Pruzin, supra note 60. 
63 C.H. Lu & P.C. Tang, China Finally Accepts Taiwan’s Designation Name to WTO, CENTRAL 
NEWS AGENCY TAIWAN, July 22, 2005, http://times.hinet.net/news/20050722/English/5577281. 
htm. 
64 Sofia Wu, Taiwan Protests WTO Member Directory Changes, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY TAIWAN, 
Mar. 4, 2006.  
418 AJWH [VOL. 1:401 
 
 
Although Taiwan agreed in its accession negotiations to seek 
membership in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, that 
negotiation has stalled over opposition from China. China is concerned that 
accession could give the implication that Taiwan’s government is not part of 
China. This implication could arise from the listing of the specific 
governmental entities that will abide by the Agreement. Ironically, China 
itself is not a party to the Agreement, but apparently can still influence who 
may join.65 
Now that Taiwan is a Member of the WTO, its status there seems secure.  
The WTO Agreement does not contain any provision for expelling or 
disqualifying Member governments. Nevertheless, the trading system has 
shown a continuing ability to improvise; so anything is possible.66 Should 
Taiwan ever come under the political control of China, the question of 
multiple votes might be raised.  At this time, Macao China and Hong Kong 
China get their own separate votes in the WTO.  
Although some commentators have suggested that Taiwan and China’s 
membership in the WTO puts them on the same par as each other, that does 
not necessarily have implications for Taiwan and China’s bilateral 
relationship. 67  After all, Hong Kong China and Macao China are also 
Members of the WTO, and no one assumes that this status will change their 
legal relationships with China. But given the history of animosity between 
Taiwan and China, the fact that the two countries are now Members of the 
world trade club could influence their mutual paths of legal socialization. 
Some analysts have suggested that because the Agreement Establishing 
the WTO is a multilateral treaty that it is conceptually decomposable into a 
combination of all possible bilateral treaties among Members. With 149 
WTO Members, that would be 11,026 bilaterals. In my view, this is a 
misleading way to look at the WTO. The fact that China and Taiwan are both 
Members of the WTO does not mean that they have a bilateral trade 
agreement. Rather, they have both done the same thing; each has joined the 
WTO.  
Of course, in joining the WTO, both Taiwan and China chose not to 
invoke Non-Application under Article XIII of the WTO Agreement. The 
absence of Non-Application might be construed as “application,” but 
                                                 
65  Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Reach Agreement to Facilitate Taiwan Joining Government 
Procurement Pact, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A4 (June 5, 2006). 
66 For example, consider the example of Yugoslavia which had joined the GATT in 1966, but was 
excluded from the GATT in 1993 following a change in government. The successor states Serbia and 
Montenegro remain in line as candidates to join the WTO.  By contrast, when non-GATT-party East 
Germany was absorbed into West Germany, which was a huge economic change for world trade, the 
GATT did not insist on a membership application from East Germany. In practice, East Germany 
was more favored than Serbia in the accession process. 
67 See John Shijian Mo, Settlement of Disputes between Mainland China and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan within the WTO, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 145, 168 (2003) (“Being equal Members 
with Mainland China does not change the fact that Taiwan is part of China.”). 
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application is not the same thing as an explicit bilateral agreement. What 
“application” means is that Taiwan and China agreed that WTO rules would 
apply inter se just as they normally apply between all other pairs of WTO 
Member countries.  So Taiwan and China have legal obligations toward each 
other as Members of the WTO but not through a treaty between them. Thus, 
the fact that China and Taiwan are Members of the WTO does not mean that 
China acknowledges Taiwan’s legal personality on the international plane.68  
For Taiwan to join the WTO did not require China to sign any WTO 
document.  Taiwan became a Member of the WTO after the WTO approved 
the Protocol of Accession with Taiwan, and then Taiwan signed (or 
otherwise approved) the Protocol.69  
Because the WTO Agreement imposes obligations on China with 
respect to how it treats Taiwan and on Taiwan with respect to how it treats 
China, the entry of both parties into the WTO has the potential for changing 
their bilateral economic and political relationship. By permitting Taiwan to 
join the WTO through accession, the WTO and its Members acknowledged 
that Taiwan is a separate customs territory “possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the matters provided for” 
in the WTO Agreement. Thus, it could be that WTO Member governments 
are now estopped from denying that Taiwan possesses such autonomy. 
When Taiwan’s accession to the WTO was approved, Taiwan’s 
President Chen Shui-bian said, with regard to Taiwan and China, that “The 
WTO offers a forum for both sides to interact in a multilateral context and try 
to learn to live with each other under one roof, as competitors, business rivals, 
or even partners.”70
 
 So far, little induced harmony has seemingly occurred, 
but the potential is always there for both governments to use the WTO forum 
for communication.71 
Taiwan has a number of trade restrictions against China that may violate 
WTO rules and could be the basis of a dispute against Taiwan lodged by 
China. The chief one is Taiwan’s discrimination against trade in Chinese 
goods, trade in Chinese services involving investment-related commercial 
presence and the movement of natural persons. These types of trade entail a 
requirement for pre-approval.72 Direct commerce between Taiwan and the 
                                                 
68 Recall that countries or customs unions may join the WTO following a two-thirds vote by the 
Ministerial Conference. WTO Agreement, Art. XII:2. Thus, the drafters of the WTO Agreement 
assumed that a minority of WTO Members might oppose granting membership to a particular 
applicant. 
69 See Protocol of Accession of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, ¶ 9, WT/L/433 (Nov. 11, 2001). 
70 Chris Rugaber, WTO Membership Could Improve Cross-Strait Ties, Taiwan Official Says, Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 2038 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
71 See Josephine Wang-Ho, Taiwan and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 61, 63 (1992); Chan, 
supra note 3, at 292. 
72 Hsieh, supra note 11, at 1213–16. 
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Mainland was long prohibited by Taiwan but was slightly liberalized in July 
2006. 
So far, however, China has not brought a case against Taiwan, 
apparently because doing so would acknowledge Taiwan’s separateness 
from China.73 China has also showed an unwillingness to fulfill its own 
requirements under WTO rules to notify Taiwan before initiating a safeguard 
action against its trade or an antidumping investigation of goods from 
Taiwan.74 Even so, Taiwan has not invoked WTO dispute settlement against 
China. Recently, China accepted a visit by a Taiwanese government official 
to conduct an antidumping investigation75 and agreed to talk with Taiwan 
about a proposed import safeguard by Taiwan on towels.76 
Perhaps the most significant potential effect of Taiwan’s WTO 
membership is that it could invoke WTO dispute settlement should China 
attempt to impose economic sanctions against Taiwan. The WTO dispute 
system is the only international body that Taiwan would have access to as 
Taiwan cannot lodge cases before the International Court of Justice or bring 
a complaint to the U.N. Security Council. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Taiwan was able to join the WTO because membership is not restricted 
to states, and so being a Member does not carry with it any implication about 
statehood or independence and is not necessarily a way-station to statehood.  
Still, there is one interesting historical example of a road from GATT/WTO 
membership to statehood – Zimbabwe which, as the British Colony Southern 
Rhodesia, was an original Member of the GATT in 1948.  When Southern 
Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, it nonetheless retained its GATT party status. 
In 1980 when Zimbabwe joined the United Nations, Zimbabwe was at last 
accepted as a state. To be sure, GATT membership was not a major cause of 
Zimbabwe’s success. 
Even though it is now a Member of the WTO, Taiwan is often 
considered to be part of China. Nevertheless, given the high profile of the 
WTO, and the fact that it is the only multilateral organization where both 
China and Taiwan are Members, the WTO experience will invariably be 
pointed to in a positive way by advocates of providing some official status 
for Taiwan in other functional international organizations. Analysts have 
suggested that the WTO experience shows the practicality of having both 
Taiwan and China as Members enjoying equal rights and obligations.  
                                                 
73 Id. at 1217. 
74 Id. at 1219–20. 
75 David Lague, Trade Dispute Forces China to Talk with Taiwan, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE,  Apr. 5, 
2006, at 1; Taiwan Official Visits China for Anti-Dumping Probe, BBC MONITORING,  July 4, 2006. 
76 Taiwan, China Hold Talks at WTO on Towel Imports, BBC MONITORING, July 4, 2006. 
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When Taiwan joined the WTO, there was a news story stating that based 
on the “WTO formula,”77 Taiwan would seek to join other international 
organizations in the future, such as the World Intellectual Property Rights 
Organization (WIPO), the World Customs Organization, the ISO, and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). So far 
this has not happened.78 As Qingjiang Kong has pointed out, Taiwan has not 
gained any significant new “diplomatic space” since its accession to the 
WTO.79 
Aside from a statehood requirement for membership, another 
impediment against reusing the WTO formula is that in many international 
organizations, there is apparently no formal status for Observers. Although 
that status is not part of the GATT or WTO Agreement, observership has 
been a long tradition of the trading system. That status made it easier for 
Taiwan (and China) to join the WTO.   
After Taiwan’s accession to the WTO was approved by the WTO 
Ministerial Council in November 2001, the WTO Director-General of that 
time, Mike Moore, declared that “With Chinese Taipei’s membership, the 
WTO is taking another step towards achieving universal membership.”80 
Moore seemed to be saying that the WTO would benefit from membership 
universality. Unfortunately, that aspiration does not seem to be shared by 
most international organizations.  
Even in the less formal setting of transgovernmental cooperation, 
Taiwan often cannot get into the door. For example, the Kimberley Process 
Certification scheme for conflict diamonds will not allow Taiwan to be a 
participating country. The Kimberley website, however, does note that 
Chinese Taipei has met the minimum requirements.81 
Taiwan’s Failed Quest to Join the WHO 
Perhaps the most serious contradiction between an IO’s purpose and its 
exclusionary membership policy is the WHO which not only has resisted 
allowing Taiwan to rejoin,82 but has also resisted an observer status for 
Taiwan in the World Health Assembly and meaningful participation in 
WHO programs. Taiwan has been seeking to gain observer status at the 
                                                 
77 Premier Explains Composition of WTO Team, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY TAIWAN, Jan. 3, 2002, 
 http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=12755. 
78 Taiwan has observer status in the OECD Competition Committee and the Steel Committee. 
79 Qingjiang Kong, Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: What are the Legitimate Expectations from the 
WTO?, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 91, 96 n.18 (2004). 
80 Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference Approves Accession of Chinese Taipei (Nov. 
11, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr253_e.htm. 
81 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=participants. The Kimberley Process was 
granted a WTO waiver in February 2003 through a consensus that apparently included Taiwan. 
82 Taiwan was expelled from the WHO in 1972. 
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World Health Assembly for over a decade.  At the most recent World Health 
Assembly in May 2006, Taiwan again was prevented from attending, even 
though it has voluntarily complied with the international health regulation 
promulgated by the WHO. The WHO even refuses to issue press passes to 
journalists from Taiwan. 
Is there any basis for a legitimation of the WHO’s exclusionary practices 
toward Taiwan? One might be that the WHO lacks authority in its 
Constitution to open up to Taiwan.83 Taiwan cannot be a WHO Member 
because it is not a state.84 Taiwan cannot be a WHO Associate Member 
because it is responsible for its international relations.85 Taiwan is neither an 
IO nor an NGO so it cannot have relations with the WHO under the relevant 
provisions of the WHO Constitution.86 Although it is true that the World 
Health Assembly, as an assembly, might be thought to have some implied 
power of association beyond those specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution, the narrow decision of the International Court of Justice in the 
World Health Assembly Nuclear Weapons case might counsel against any 
teleological interpretation of the Assembly’s competence.87  
But this answer seems unsatisfactory for several reasons.  One is that it is 
inconsistent with WHO practice of giving “observer” status to several 
entities whose legal personality does not fit WHO rules. Such entities 
currently include: The Holy See, the Order of Malta, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies, and Palestine.88 Another reason is that Taiwan’s 
exclusion is inconsistent with the functional public health mission of the 
WHO and its claim to be a “world” organization. Article 1 of the WHO 
Constitution states that the WHO’s objective “shall be the attainment by all 
peoples of the highest level of health,” and it seems hard to reconcile that 
aspiration with the exclusion of a country that has a population of 23 million 
and is the world’s 17th largest economy. Moreover, Taiwan has been a 
front-line country for public health risks such as SARS and avian flu.  
                                                 
83 If Taiwan is a non-State territorial entity, there is no such category of WHO membership or 
observership. 
84 See Constitution of the World Health Organization Art. 3, July 22, 1946, 14 UNTS 185. Taiwan is 
currently recognized as a State by about 25 nations. Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving 
Cross-Border Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 465 n. 88 (2000). 
85 See Constitution of the World Health Organization, id. Art. 8 (providing associate membership 
status for territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations). Puerto 
Rico is an Associate Member under this provision. 
86 See id. Arts. 70, 71. Taiwan is a governmental organization. For a discussion of NGO contributions 
to the WHO, see DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS ON AND 
ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE 79 (2000). 
87 See GIAN LUCA BURCI & CLAUDE-HENRI VIGNES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 115–18 
(2004) (discussing the Nuclear Weapons decision). 
88 Id. at 36–38. See also U.S. Public Law 108–235, An Act to Address the Participation of Taiwan in 
the World Health Organization, June 14,  2004, § 1(a)(8), available at http://www.access.gpo. 
gov/nara/publaw/108publ.html. 
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Diseases know no political boundaries, a point well recognized by the World 
Medical Association which supports giving Taiwan observer status.89  
That the trading system has always been open to non-state entities is not 
accidental; the designers of the post World War II system recognized that its 
functional mission would be furthered by not making membership 
contingent on statehood.90 The drafters of the WHO Constitution did not 
have that foresight, but this defect can be remedied by a constitutional 
amendment. When the Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was 
drafted in 2000, the drafters provided for participation in the Commission by 
a “fishing entity.”91 Taiwan joined the Commission under that provision (as 
Chinese Taipei) in 2004. This modality seems like a good prescription for 
the WHO for how to amend its Constitution.  
Short of a constitutional amendment, there might be other ways of 
providing for ongoing interchanges between Taiwan and the WHO. For 
information exchange itself, the WHO could simply name certain Taiwanese 
officials as consultants. For transmitting Taiwan’s views to the WHO, 
perhaps the WTO could serve as a conduit as it does between Taiwan and the 
IMF. As noted above, an Annex to the Accession Agreement between the 
WTO and Taiwan provides that the WTO “shall take measures . . . to ensure 
effective presentation of Chinese Taipei’s case to the Fund, including, 
without limitation, the transmission to the Fund of any views communicated 
by Chinese Taipei to the WTO.”92 For the WTO to do that with the WHO  
would require authorization, however, and getting that authorization would 
be impossible without the consent of China. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Taiwan is an anomaly in international relations. It is a self-governing, 
stable, prosperous nation whose identity is sharply contested. It is an island 
of democracy in a region where many states are not. Taiwan does not claim 
to be a state, and yet often operates like one. It has joined the WTO, and 
would like to be part of other IOs. Yet Taiwan’s future as a separate identity 
                                                 
89  Press Release, World Medical Association, World Medical Association Urges Taiwan’s 
Acceptance to the WHO as an Observer (May 16, 2003). The World Medical Association was 
founded in 1947 and succeeded a similar international NGO founded in 1926. 
90  See Charter of the International Trade Organization, 1948, Art. 71, available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm. See also Damrosch, supra note 5, at 38 
(noting the “prescience” and pragmatism of GATT’s framers, and suggesting that other international 
agreements and IOs can be expected to come under pressure for change when their membership is 
based on formalistic legal constructs). 
91 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, Art. 9.2, available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri 
/texts/fish.west.cent.pac.2000.html. 
92 Special Exchange Agreement, supra note 24, Art. VI:3. 
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is doubtful. Taiwan faces, just 90 miles away, an increasingly powerful 
China that yearns for eventual unification with Taiwan. 
Against great odds, Taiwan finally succeeded in joining the WTO in late 
2001. As with many new WTO Members, Taiwan had to make numerous 
concessions in its accession accord, and yet more so than with any other 
applicant, Taiwan’s entry into the WTO enhanced Taiwan’s sovereignty 
when sovereignty is understood in its modern meaning. Joining the WTO did 
not transform Taiwan into a state, but Taiwan gained greater economic and 
political respect and perhaps a legal bridge to the future. 
As a WTO Member, Taiwan may participate in writing and 
administering world trade rules, and Taiwan is doing so with great relish.  It 
has been an active participant in Doha Round negotiations and has put 
forward thoughtful and constructive proposals on regional trade agreements, 
trade remedies, trade and environment, fishery trade, and the third-party role 
in dispute settlement. In WTO operating committees, Taiwan has proposed 
reforms for negotiations on government procurement, and has supported the 
pharmaceutical companies in maintaining the value of their patents. In 
dispute settlement, Taiwan has not yet been a litigating party (complaining 
or defending), but it has been a third party in 12 cases.  
Taiwan’s lack of membership in the United Nations has not yet led to 
difficulties in the WTO, but may do so in the future because Taiwan cannot 
participate in international standard-setting mechanisms whose standards are 
the source of WTO obligations in the TBT, SPS, and GATS Agreements. A 
key problem is that WTO rules generally require that qualifying 
standard-setting mechanisms be “open” to all WTO Members. Because 
organizations like the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Electrotechnical Commission, and the ISO are not open to Taiwan or 
Taiwanese standards bodies, Taiwan could insist that standards of those 
international organizations not form the basis of WTO obligations.93 So far, 
Taiwan has not invoked this Taiwan Exclusion Disqualification.   
Another problem is that because of the discrimination against it, Taiwan 
cannot meet its obligations under the SPS, TBT, and GATS Agreements to 
participate in international standard-setting mechanisms. This is a current, 
not just theoretical, problem, and so the WTO should take action to promote 
Taiwan’s effective participation in those organizations. One possibility 
would be for the WTO to act as a conduit between Taiwan and the various 
international standard-setting mechanisms through the WTO Committees 
that regularly correspond with them.94 
Taiwan and China are equal in both being Members of the WTO, but 
that situation does not translate into a bilateral treaty between Taiwan and 
                                                 
93 This Disqualification would not apply to the three international standard-setting mechanisms 
specifically denoted in the SPS Agreement. See supra note 50. 
94 See, e.g., SPS Agreement, Art. 12.3; GATS Agreement, art. XXVI; TRIPS Agreement, Art. 68. 
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China.  In other words, Taiwan’s relationship with China through the WTO 
is the same as Hong Kong and Macao’s relationship with China through the 
WTO.  The relationship is one of membership parallelism.    
Nevertheless, WTO membership does give a country important 
procedural rights such as the ability to invoke WTO dispute settlement 
against another WTO Member. In that regard, Taiwan’s membership in the 
WTO does accord it with world legal status that it lacked before 2002.  
Indeed, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only international 
tribunal in which Taiwan has standing to insist upon the rule of law. From 
that perspective, one can say that Taiwan’s WTO membership brings it 
closer to China and gives both Members a neutral forum to discuss and 
negotiate their mutual differences. Recently, as noted above, China and 
Taiwan have undertaken bilateral consultations within the context of the 
WTO. 
That Taiwan’s status as a WTO Member is meaningful can be seen by 
Chinese’s petty protests against Taiwan in Geneva on issues such as what 
Taiwan is called and how its personnel are titled in the WTO phonebook.  
That China would cavil is perhaps not surprising but what is surprising, and 
disturbing, is that the WTO Secretariat is engaging in nomenclature 
discrimination against Taiwan. Unfortunately, WTO dispute settlement does 
not offer Taiwan any possibility for judicial review of this kowtowing by 
WTO bureaucrats. 
Although Taiwan was successful in joining the WTO, Taiwan has been 
unsuccessful in joining the WHO, or even in gaining observer status in it.  
The WHO may have a constitutional reason to deny Taiwan’s participation, 
but its animus toward Taiwan seems to go beyond that, extending even to 
journalists from Taiwan. Certainly if the WHO were predisposed toward a 
less political approach to its world health mission, it could find a way to open 
its doors to Taiwan. 
This article has sought to take note of the very interesting development 
in international law of Taiwan’s membership in the WTO. Examining 
Taiwan’s membership offers a good window into how the WTO operates 
and the possibilities for the peaceful evolution of Taiwan’s place in world 
affairs.   
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